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TOWARD A MEANING-FULL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE NEUTRALITY
BRUCE LEDEWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
Because I have done little but write about secularism and religion
during the past six years, I may have lost perspective concerning the
centrality and intractability of the secular-religious divide in American
public life. Why would I imagine that the issue of the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance must be resolved for the sake of the
health of the culture? Why would I think that in this issue, and others
like it, there is something deep that affects most aspects of our public
life and even our more personal lives?
That is why the controversy in June 2011 over the omission of the
words "under God" from an NBC-TV feature in its coverage of the U.S.
Open-golf, for the uninitiated-was reassuring. I have never actually
seen this clip, but it was widely reported that the video featured the
Pledge of Allegiance being recited by schoolchildren, intercut with pat-
riotic images. Twice during the segment, the words "under God" were
omitted, with the second reference also eliminating the phrase "one
Nation."
The omission sparked an immediate Twitter-induced outcry and
NBC responded with an apology by Dan Hicks during its opening cov-
erage:
We began our coverage of this final round just about three hours ago
and when we did it was our intent to begin the coverage of this U.S.
Open Championship with a feature that captured the patriotism of
our national championship being held in our nation's capital for the
third time. Regrettably, a portion of the Pledge of Allegiance that was
in that feature was edited out. It was not done to upset anyone and
we'd like to apologize to those of you who were offended by it.i
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This paper was prepared with
support from the Duquesne Summer Research Writing Program. A short version of this article
was delivered and discussed in the wonderful oral presentations that all the presenters in this
symposium issue participated in at Duquesne on November 3, 2011, with support from the Du-
quesne Law School Scholarship Fund. My thanks go to Dean Ken Gormley and Professor Jane
Moriarty, Associate Dean of Scholarship at Duquesne Law School, for making the event possible.
1. Cindy Boren, NBC Apologizes for Cutting "Under God" from Pledge ofAllegiance Before U.S.
Open, WASH. POST BLOG (June 19, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-
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This apology was notable because it did not address the question
many people wanted answered: had NBC intentionally edited out the
words "under God" to avoid offending non-theists-both minority reli-
gious believers and nonbelievers? If so, NBC was making a statement in
the fight over removing the "under God" language from the Pledge.
That is how many people saw the matter. Five days later, on June
24, Family Research Council President Tony Perkins hosted six-term
Missouri Congressman Todd Akin on his weekly webcast radio show
and asked Akin why NBC would omit that language. Akin's response
got at least as much attention as the original video: "Well, I think NBC
has a long record of being very liberal, and at the heart of liberalism
really is a hatred for God and the belief that government should re-
place God." 2
This charge-that liberals hate God-sparked a great deal of criti-
cism, which led to a sort of apology by Akin:
People, who know me and my family, know that we take our faith
and beliefs very seriously. As Christians, we would never question
the sincerity of anyone's personal relationship with God. My state-
ment during my radio interview was directed at the political move-
ment, Liberalism not at any specific individual. If my statement gave
a different impression, I offer my apologies.3
More significantly, Akin clarified his comment to indicate that he was
aiming at fights over Government religious expression: "I think I can
clarify that I was talking about public references, too. I think that clari-
fies it a little bit."4
- At this point, I asked on Huffington Post, why would anyone now
dispute Akin's claim?s I received a lot of responses, both on Huffington
Post and elsewhere, but no disagreement with this implied claim: the
American left, however it is defined, does believe in the principle that
something meant to define American nationhood, like the Pledge,
should omit a religious term like God. Politicians cannot yet affirm this
lead/post/nbc-apologizes-for-cutting-under-god-from-pledge-of-allegiance-before-us-
open/2011/06/19/AG8MgtbH-blog.html.
2. Chris Good, Rep. Todd Akin (Sort of) Apologizes for Saying That Liberals Hate God, THE
ATLANTIC (June 29, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/rep-
todd-akin-sort-of-apologizes-for-saying-that-liberals-hate-god/241205/.
3. Id.
4. Tanya Somanader, GOP Rep. Todd Akin: 'No, I'm Not Going To Apologize' For Saying Liber-
als Hate God, THINK PROGRESS (June 28, 2011, 10:50 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2011/06/28/255780/akin-not-apoogizing-liberals-god/.
5. Bruce Ledewitz Well, Don't We Liberals Hate the Public God?, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June




publicly because there are still so many religious believers who disa-
gree. For similar pragmatic reasons, many liberals agree with Douglas
Laycock when he writes that he is "not campaigning to amend the
Pledge."6 Nevertheless, in theory, the liberal position-of both liberal
believers and nonbelievers-is that, pursuant to the neutrality doc-
trine, God has no place in government's expression in the public
square.
I draw several conclusions from this episode and its aftermath
that explain the importance I attach to my work of reinterpreting gov-
ernment neutrality toward religion. First, the basic Establishment
Clause issue is the place of God in the public square. Everything else is
a dress rehearsal for that main event. Second, many religious Ameri-
cans regard any attack on God, successful or not, as much worse than a
normal political disagreement, perhaps even as a manifestation of the
demonic. Third, a portion of the growing non-believing segment of the
population is alienated from religious imagery and disdainful of reli-
gious believers.
This situation is poison for politics in particular and community in
general. It is not clear to me how we are to live together as a nation if
every election at its deepest level turns into a referendum on God. Too
many Americans, both left and right, agree with Ronald Dworkin that
the Establishment Clause question is, fundamentally, a test of national
identity. This is how Dworkin posed the basic Establishment Clause
issue in his book Is Democracy Possible Here?:
Should we be a religious nation, collectively committed to values of
faith and worship, but with tolerance for religious minorities includ-
ing nonbelievers? Or should we be a nation committed to thoroughly
secular government but with tolerance and accommodation for peo-
ple of religious faith? A religious nation that tolerates nonbelief? Or a
secular nation that tolerates religion?7
Not only is Dworkin's question not the kind of question a nation
like ours can answer in such either/or terms, but even the attempt to
answer it-even the idea that we should answer it-is a political and
social disaster.
This article represents an attempted alternative to Dworkin's
formulation of the basic Establishment Clause issue. Since this is a con-
stitutional issue, I hope that the Supreme Court can contribute to re-
6. Douglas Laycock, Reviews of a Lifetime, 89 TEx. L. REv. 949, 964 (2011) [hereinafter
Laycock, Reviews ofa Lifetime].




solving our conflict over religion in the public square. In order to do
that, the Justices need a constitutional vision of the Establishment
Clause that promotes common ground and solidarity among majority
believers, minority believers and nonbelievers. That is what I hope the
vision of meaning-full neutrality contained in this article promotes.
This article proceeds in five parts. First, I explain why I hope the
future of the Establishment Clause lies in the realm of government
neutrality. Then I proceed in Part II to critique the basic form of neu-
trality that much of the legal academy has supported until now as its
understanding of the Establishment Clause. The flaw in this form of
neutrality is its failure to consider public expressions of meaning as a
positive good. In Part III, I describe public expressions of meaning that
do not utilize traditional religious imagery and argue that these are
neutral toward religion. In Part IV, I sharpen my disagreement with
mainstream neutrality theory by applying this same approach to some
governmental expressions of meaning that do utilize religious imagery,
especially including the word God, and try to show that they are also
not inconsistent with government neutrality toward religion. Finally, in
the Conclusion, using Christopher Lund's article on legislative prayers
as a starting point, I try to set forth what a meaning-full neutrality
would look like.
I. WHY NEUTRALITY IS OUR BEST OPTION
Although Christopher Lund and I are debating the future form of
neutrality in this Symposium, the first question that must be asked is
the following: why should there be any form of government neutrality
in the area of religion? Why not interpret the Constitution as permit-
ting some form of government endorsement and support of religion?
Zachary Calo and Samuel Levine are discussing that question here, but
I must address it briefly as well. Then again, why not utilize the law of
standing to avoid deciding these sorts of issues, as the Supreme Court
is increasingly doing? Mark Rahdert and Richard Albert are discussing
justiciability, so my contribution here on that topic will be brief as well.
In rejecting religious endorsement, I am not referring to extreme
formulations, such as Christian Reconstructionism. Nor do many peo-
ple propose public subsidies for religious institutions as such, so that is
not an issue either. I am referring, instead, to a constitutional interpre-
8. Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94
MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010).
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tation of the Establishment Clause that permits endorsement of the
traditional biblical God in public pronouncements such as the Pledge of
Allegiance, public displays of the Ten Commandments, and all the rest
of the public religiosity that the Supreme Court has either already ap-
proved or seems ready to approve. In the academy, these kinds of reli-
gious expressions by government are most ably defended by Steven
Smith. On the Supreme Court, they are defended by Justice Antonin
Scalia.
The distinction between general support of religion in certain
forms and government neutrality toward religion in certain forms is
not always clear. As Steven Smith points out in his important recent
article reinterpreting the school prayer decisions,9 Justice Potter Stew-
art in his dissent in the Schempp decision, which outlawed devotional
Bible reading in the public schools, "agreed that the Constitution re-
quired government neutrality toward religion."io Chief Justice
Rehnquist has approved various types of religious expression by gov-
ernment as historical acknowledgments of religion's role in American
life,11 thus not always challenging neutrality. In addition, Justice
O'Connor approved a number of such expressions as ceremonial deism
that lacked genuine religious content.12 Others defend government
religious expression under the rubric of religious liberty, such as allow-
ing students in public schools an opportunity to speak freely and pray.
Although I find these arguments unsatisfactory, these formulations do
not necessarily conflict with a theory of government neutrality toward
religion. Later in this article I defend another form of neutrality con-
sistent with most of these same government religious expressions.
Neutrality is potentially a big tent, and a significant segment of public
religious expression may be consistent with it.
Nevertheless, there is a distinction between any form of neutrality
and a genuinely pro-religion stance. Justice Scalia means something
9. Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School
Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945 (2011).
10. Id. at 961 (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting)).
11. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 30 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment). ("All of these events strongly suggest that our national culture
allows public recognition of our Nation's religious history and character.").
12. See id. at 37 (O'Connor J., concurring in the judgment). ("I believe that government can, in
a discrete category of cases, acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the Constitu-
tion. This category of 'ceremonial deism' most clearly encompasses such things as the national
motto ('In God We Trust'), religious references in traditional patriotic songs such as The Star-
Spangled Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its sessions
('God save the United States and this honorable Court').").
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very different from any form of neutrality when he votes to uphold
government religious expression. For Justice Scalia, the recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance, for example, is a genuine manifestation of
public piety toward the divine, which, in his view, does not violate the
Establishment Clause: "[T]here is nothing unconstitutional in a State's
favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and
acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments."13 And this "God" that Justice Scalia invokes is not the
Deist God and also is not, if I may extrapolate from Justice Scalia's dis-
missive reference to "believers in unconcerned deities," Paul Tillich's
ground of beings4 or any other sophisticated theological understanding
of God. This God is the tent revival "God of monotheism," "in the singu-
lar and with a capital G."is Government may lead prayers to this God in
order to invoke His blessing and benign intervention. Even if attempts
like mine to uphold religious imagery within the limits of neutrality are
specious, they are not the same as allowing government to lead pray-
ers to God.
Justice Scalia's explanation for why government is permitted to
acknowledge and worship the "single Creator" is, essentially, "histori-
cal practices"-that George Washington issued a Thanksgiving Proc-
lamation and so forth.16 This is not the forum to evaluate the historical
argument, but I have elsewhere acknowledged that Justice Scalia may
have the better of the historical record in this argument.17
The weaknesses of Justice Scalia's pro-monotheism view, howev-
er, despite its historical support, are twofold. First, this historical ap-
proach could as readily justify government invocation and
acknowledgment of Christianity, as Justice John Paul Stevens argued in
Van Orden v. Perry.18 Justice Scalia has always denied this, but when he
first did so, in Lee v. Weisman in 1992, he was forced to distinguish
between the Establishment Clause "as adopted" on the one hand, and
13. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: VOLUME 1, at 235-36 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1951).
15. McCreary Co., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893-894 & n.3 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 885-88 (citing examples).
17. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM 61 (2011) [herein-
after LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS] ("In the end Justice Scalia may have had more his-
torical evidence on his side.").
18. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 729 (2005) (Stevens., dissenting). ("[T]he history of the
Establishment Clause's original meaning just as strongly supports a preference for Christianity as
it does a preference for monotheism. ").
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"our constitutional tradition"19 on the other, as if developments subse-
quent to adoption could remove authority possessed by the majority
when a constitutional provision was enacted. This is the "living consti-
tution" approach that originalists and textualists like Justice Scalia
usually disdain. History does not justify this constitutional restriction
on government endorsement of Christianity.
Nor do I think that Justice Scalia's anti-Christian interpretation re-
ally has anything to do with history. The refusal of Justice Scalia to take
seriously the claim of Christianity to preference in American history,
combined with what I take to be his Holocaust consciousness-in
2004, Justice Scalia reportedly invoked the separation of church and
state as providing insufficient protection to the Jews of Europe during
WWH2o-suggests to me that Justice Scalia is personally and profound-
ly opposed to any such public preference for Christianity because of
the untenable position in which it would place America's Jews. While I
admire this honorable restraint, I do not think the pro-monotheism
position can explain this limitation on Christianity in a principled way.
Differently put, it ought to be just as unthinkable, or just as permissi-
ble, to impose God on nonbelievers as it is to impose Christ on Jews.
The other problem with the pro-monotheism position is that list-
ing historical practices is not a constitutional interpretation, for rea-
sons I have elsewhere explained.21 To set forth an actual interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, it is necessary for a court to explain what
the nonestablishment principle means. Justice Scalia has himself
acknowledged that a well-worn historic practice can still be unconsti-
tutional,22 as has obviously occurred throughout American constitu-
tional history, with racial segregation as the most obvious example.
What then is the constitutional principle behind the pro-
monotheism position? Justice Scalia inadvertently stated what I think
is the best interpretation of the nonestablishment principle when he
19. 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Thom Hartmann, Scalia To Synagogue-Jews Are Safer With Christians In Charge, THOM
HARTMANN PROGRAM (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.thomhartmann.com/articles/2004/12/scalia-
synagogue-jews-are-safer-christians-charge. I remember hearing about this episode at the time,
but I could only document a reference by the liberal radio talk show host Thom Hartmann, who
cites other sources for the story. Justice Scalia spoke in my presence at the Centennial Celebration
of Duquesne Law School on September 25, 2011 and he repeated the same point, so I do not
believe he would find this characterization unfair.
21. See Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a Higher Law Resolve the Estab-
lishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY'S L.J. 41, 56-57 (2009) [hereinafter Ledewitz, Government
Speech].




explained why "governmental endorsement of a particular version of
the Decalogue" would be unconstitutional, but that this was not the
situation in the McCreary County case. The inclusion of the particular
version of the Ten Commandments by the government in that case was
not put forward "to take sides in a theological dispute."23
Forbidding government from taking sides in a theological dispute
is one of the reasons-along with protection of taxpayer funds-that
the Establishment Clause was adopted and indeed why State church
establishments were dismantled in the early Nineteenth Century.24
The fact that this principle came so readily forward to Justice Scalia
supports this view of our history.
This principle of not taking sides in a theological dispute supports
a modern reinterpretation of the American history of public endorse-
ments of God. Endorsements of God have been uncontroversial in
American history because, for a long time, they were not considered to
be taking sides in a theological dispute. For most of American history
just about everybody believed in some form of God. That is why Steven
Smith can refer to this widespread traditional view as "ecumenical
providentialism."2s Belief in God united almost all religious believers
throughout American history.
But with the growth in America of nonmonotheistic faiths and of
genuine nonbelief, the endorsement by government of the God of mon-
otheism has become the taking of a side in a hotly contested theologi-
cal dispute-the existence of God. The existence of God is not accepted
by everyone. It is rejected not only by nonbelievers but by pious
nonmonotheists. Thus, in principle, and consistently with his approach
to the history and text of the Establishment Clause, Justice Scalia
should now oppose government-sponsored worship of God.
Another alternative to neutrality is Steven Smith's recent rejection
of the neutrality principle in his essay Our Agnostic Constitution.26
Smith does not urge the embrace of religion as the constitutional norm,
but argues that while the Constitution is agnostic about God, that is not
necessarily the case for American politics or government. Thus, belief
in God cannot be made constitutive of the American public community,
but it can be affirmed at different layers of government while denied at
others. On this reasoning, the recognition of God becomes something
23. Id. at 894, n.4.
24. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, at 509 & nn.9, 10 (1947).
25. Smith, supra note 9, at 968.
26. Steven D. Smith, OurAgnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 120 (2008).
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like our struggle over gay marriage, with some states but not others
affirming it and other not, and with some local governments affirming
it while the respective State government takes a different (or no) posi-
tion. In this view, the Constitution would take no position on gay mar-
riage.27
Smith's agnostic approach has a great deal to recommend it. If in-
deed we faced a fundamental identity conflict, as Dworkin suggests,
Smith's approach would be about the best possible understanding we
could have.
But I refuse to accept the conflict over God as inevitable and be-
yond compromise. I see this conflict as a misunderstanding that is as
damaging to secularism as it is to relations between believers and
nonbelievers.
Smith's analogy to gay marriage illustrates the potential damage
that I fear. As a nation, we are going to fight about gay marriage for
many years. While that is not great news, compromises like civil union
will happen and conservative politicians will need gay political contri-
butions and the usual fudging will occur. The debate will be divisive
but will eventually be resolved. I cannot see a debate about God pro-
ceeding in any kind of similarly healthy way. That God/no God debate
would be much harder to resolve.
Of course Smith might respond that although my neutrality pro-
posal purports to encourage common ground and harmony, that result
is no more likely to occur under my proposal than his. Go ahead, he
might say, and tell nonbelievers that they share common ground in the
use of religious symbols until the cows come home; your saying it will
not change the hostility on the ground. Perhaps that will prove true.
But only some form of neutrality holds out any hope for finding com-
mon ground between believers and nonbelievers.
For all the above reasons, the principle that government must be
neutral with respect to religion in general and monotheism in particu-
lar is the best interpretation of the Establishment Clause for our time
and place. But of course, that is only the starting point of an examina-
tion of what the Clause should be taken to mean. As I will explain be-
low, the forms of neutrality that are commonly proposed are quite
flawed and will not lead America to a future of political and social
health.
27. Id. at 151-53.
2012]1 733
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Recently, instead of resolving the doctrinal impasse over neutrali-
ty, the Supreme Court has turned to standing doctrine to dismiss Es-
tablishment Clause cases. The court restricted taxpayer standing in
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation28 and Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn29 and parental standing in Elk
Grove Unified School Dist. v. NewdoW30. Further, in a concurrence joined
by Justice Thomas in Salazar v. BuonO31, Justice Scalia raised the spec-
ter of additional standing restrictions by merely "assuming that being
'deeply offended' by a religious display (and taking steps to avoid see-
ing it) constitutes a cognizable injury... ."32
Ordinarily we might applaud the Court for ducking, and continu-
ing to duck, the Pledge of Allegiance issue. In a different context, an
Alex Bickel might praise the Court for refusing to inflame national divi-
sions over the Pledge when the Court itself is deeply divided concern-
ing symbolic government use of religious imagery and has nothing
helpful to offer the people.33 And Steven Smith similarly believes that
the nonlitigation of the "quasi-constitutional" status of both the reli-
gious and the secular positions prior to the school prayer decisions
was preferable to the struggles over judicial enforcement that we see
nOW.34
But the religion context is not the usual situation in which the
Court's reluctance to decide an issue might lessen an issue's political
divisiveness. It was the Supreme Court, unanimously on this point, that
originally promised government neutrality between religion and irre-
ligion in Everson v. Bd. of Education in 19473s and the Court has not
retreated formally from that commitment. Certainly the role of religion
in the public square and the degree of permissible government support
of religious institutions might from the beginning have been left to
democratic adjustment. Nothing in the Constitution expressly prom-
ised neutrality and the wall of separation image is, of course, not in the
text.
Having promised neutrality, however, in broad terms in a series of
cases, the Court is not now free to walk away through the manipulation
28. 551 U.S. 587, 592 (2007).
29. 131 S.Ct 1436, 1439 (2011).
30. 542 US 1 (2004).
31. 130 S.Ct. 1803, 1810 (2010).
32. Id. at 1826-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-29 (2d ed. 1986).
34. Smith, supra note 9, at 987.
35. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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of standing doctrine. A minority, but still substantial, portion of the
American people believe that the current Pledge of Allegiance is un-
constitutional because the Court itself has implied that it is. At the
same time, an even greater number of citizens agree that the Pledge
violates current Establishment Clause doctrine, but they want that
doctrine changed. The Supreme Court is responsible, in large part, for
creating these political and social tensions by endorsing a substantive
constitutional vision that supports one side in the struggle over the
Pledge.36 If a majority of the Court now feel that the Pledge is in fact
constitutional, their imprimatur on that position would lessen, rather
than enhance, national divisions. If on the other hand, the Pledge as
currently worded really is unconstitutional, the Court's turn to stand-
ing will not improve matters. If political realities preclude striking
down the Pledge, the Justices could at least try to affirm the Pledge on
the narrowest substantive grounds.37 Either way, the turn to standing
is irresponsible.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT NEUTRALITY DOCTRINES OF SILENCE AND
OMISSION
What is meant by government neutrality in the realm of religion? I
noted above my understanding of the core government neutrality
principle that underlay the disestablishment movement in the eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries-that the government may not
take sides in a theological dispute. But that is only one possible ap-
proach to neutrality.
The best known, and most influential, version of neutrality in the
American legal academy is Douglas Laycock's substantive neutrality:
government must "minimize the extent to which it either encourages
or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice,
observance or nonobservance."38 Or, more succinctly put, neutrality is
"the separation of government power from the religious choices and
36. Justice Thomas even said this in Elk Grove, though he wanted the doctrine changed. 542
U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling the Court of Appeals' decision
that the Pledge of Allegiance policy violates the Establishment Clause mistaken, but based "on a
persuasive reading of our precedent").
37. Douglas Laycock urged that course. See Laycock, Reviews of a Lifetime, supra note 6, at
964.
38. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion].
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commitments of the people."39 Laycock distinguishes substantive neu-
trality from formal neutrality, which is a form of neutrality that usually
would not allow the government to take religion into account in any
way.40 As we shall see below, the most important difference between
these two versions of neutrality has to do with the permissibility of
exemptions for religious believers from certain generally applicable
laws, such as allowing wine for sacramental purposes during Prohibi-
tion. Under formal neutrality, such exemptions are presumptively vio-
lations of the Establishment Clause because they refer to religion as a
category.
Both these forms of neutrality suffer from the same flaw. They are
like ineffective diet advice. They counsel only what may not be done in
the public square, but not what may be done. Neutrality theory cur-
rently is about silence and omission in the public square. Neutrality
says the government cannot promote religion, but says nothing about
what can be promoted. Neutrality theorists have little interest in ex-
plaining to the majority that want prayer on public occasions what
they are permitted to do short of prayer.41 This is the reason that mo-
ments of silence at public events are so popular. They, at least, are reli-
ably constitutional.42 Any other possibility is a constitutional minefield.
I think the reason for this omission to consider permitted forms of
communal expression is the relentless individualism of neutrality the-
ory. The focus is almost entirely on religious liberty. And liberty in the
context of religious neutrality is taken to mean the choice by citizens of
what they wish to do as individuals by way of religion. The point of
substantive neutrality is to prevent the government from interfering
with that free, individual choice,43 not to free the majority to engage in
meaningful public life.
It is thus often left to pro-religion voices to consider the possibili-
ties of communal expression. Communal expression is what Justice
39. Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1700 (2003)
(technically this is separation, but it is the "honorable" type of separation, which, for Laycock, is
the same as neutrality).
40. Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 38, at 999.
41. Contrast this with justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved in Co. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment), in which justice Kennedy tried to set forth alternative ways in which "[s]chool boards may
pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races" without violating
equal protection."
42. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down silent prayer in public school
but indicating that moments of silence are constitutional).
43. Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 38, at 1002. ("I mean that religion is to
be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be.").
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Scalia has tried to defend with reference to the nature of religion. For
example, in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, justice Scalia referred to
prayer as an activity performed by a people:
The reader has been told much in this case about the personal inter-
est of Mr. Weisman and his daughter, and very little about the per-
sonal interests on the other side. They are not inconsequential.
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion
were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal
avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography,
in the privacy of one's room. For most believers it is not that, and has
never been. Religious men and women of almost all denominations
have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of
God as a people, and not just as individuals, because they believe in
the "protection of divine Providence," as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence put it, not just for individuals but for societies; because
they believe God to be, as Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclama-
tion put it, the "Great Lord and Ruler of Nations." One can believe in
the effectiveness of such public worship, or one can deprecate and
deride it. But the longstanding American tradition of prayer at offi-
cial ceremonies displays with unmistakable clarity that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not forbid the government to accommodate
it.44
Justice Scalia made a similar point in his dissent in McCreary Coun-
ty about the need to be able to give "God thanks and supplication as a
people, and with respect to our national endeavors."45
Although Justice Scalia understands the importance of communal
expression, his vision of it is restrictive. Of course, the context in which
Justice Scalia was writing was the permissibility of public prayer,
which no doubt is part of the reason for Justice Scalia's narrow focus.
Nevertheless, the model that emerges from his description of a clash
between neutrality and religion is that of a believing majority that
wants to pray to, and thank, God on public occasions, on the one hand,
and dissenters, on the other, whether believers or nonbelievers, who
want to prevent such religious activity. This formulation implies that
the sole imaginable mode of deep communal expression is religious.
Why should that be? Is it not possible that there are other, nonreligious
modes of communal expression that the majority would also be willing
to utilize? Neither neutrality theory nor Justice Scalia tell us anything
about these potential alternatives.
Religious prayer is just one possibility in a symbol-rich public
square. At a conference this summer of The Institute on Religion in an
44. 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Age of Science, we sang the following hymn at chapel every day: "We
the heirs of many ages/with the wise to guide our way/honor all
earth's seers and sages/and the science of our day."
Now, could that hymn be constitutionally sung at a high school
graduation? How about at school every day? Most neutrality theorists
must squirm at this question, because this hymn feels religious. But of
course the hymn has no traditionally religious content whatever.
The potential constitutional problem is that this hymn sparks rev-
erence. Justice O'Connor, a noted neutrality proponent and the author
of the endorsement test,46 voted to uphold the "under God" language in
the Pledge of Allegiance case, Elk Grove,47 when the majority dismissed
the case for lack of standing. But Justice O'Connor wrote that she would
uphold this language essentially because she deemed the language
merely ceremonial. It was part of her commitment to ceremonial de-
ism. If, however, public references to God were actually intended to
induce a "penitent state of mind," Justice O'Connor maintained that
they would violate the Establishment Clause.48
My little hymn, conversely, is not religious in any traditional
sense. It praises science. Yet it is intended to create a reverent spirit,
which is like a penitent state of mind. Is government inculcation of
reverence thus unconstitutional? It cannot be, if we are to have a
healthy society. That hymn would seem to be a perfect expression of
reverence for learning at a high school graduation.
Neutrality theory has not considered all this. Laycock's substan-
tive neutrality emerged to resolve a particular dispute: when could
government exempt religion from generally applicable laws without
violating the neutrality requirement?49 For a long time, there was a
tension between the command of the Free Exercise Clause and the
prohibition of the Establishment Clause. Neutrality theory evolved to
resolve that problem, which it did successfully.so There was no reason
46. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984).
47. 542 U.S. 1, 33 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. Id. at 40.
49. Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 38, at 999-1006. See also Mark W.
Cordes, Religion as Speech: The Growing Role of Free Speech Jurisprudence in Protecting Religious
Liberty, 38 Sw. L. REv. 235, 274, n.343 (2008) ("Scholars have at times drawn a distinction be-
tween formal neutrality, which would prohibit any distinct treatment of religion, and substantive
neutrality, which permits special accommodations for religion so as to avoid coercive pressure on
religious conduct.").
50. Even when, in 1990, Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990), eliminated this
tension between the clauses by holding that government need never exempt religion from gener-
ally applicable laws, neutrality theorists argued that majorities should still choose to do so and
indeed that they should bind themselves to do so through laws like the Religious Freedom Resto-
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in this context of exemptions to consider public expressions of mean-
ing.
It is a serious mistake for neutrality proponents to avoid consid-
eration of public expressions of meaning. It is not only religion that is a
communal rather than an individual activity. That is true of politi-
cal/social life in general. As Robert Bellah has observed of this society,
"The question is whether you can have a society without anything im-
portant in common."si Bellah thinks that is impossible. Neutrality the-
ory should engage this communal level to promote shared values.
It may be that neutrality theorists are beginning to recognize the
need for positive, public expressions of meaning and the need for more
than just silence and omission in the public square. In his most recent
statement about these issues, Laycock addresses the problem of what
he calls "bland and generic endorsements" such as the national mot-
to.52 After first suggesting that these expressions are often de minimis,
Laycock says that this escape hatch is less and less convincing as the
nonbelieving population grows. In any event, constitutional concern
about the "under God" in the Pledge apparently cannot be so readily
dismissed because of the way the Pledge is utilized in public schools
and so forth. So, what to do about the Pledge?
One starting point would be to ask what "under God" means, other
than as a presumably unconstitutional-as Laycock sees it-
acknowledgement of the one Creator God. Laycock takes seriously the
interpretation suggested by Thomas Berg that the Pledge implies that
government is not unlimited but is subject to a higher authority.53 Mi-
chael McConnell once argued that this was why Edmond Burke sup-
ported an established church-to demonstrate the subservience of
government to higher authority.54
Laycock notes the suggestion by Christopher Eisgruber and Law-
rence Sager to substitute "'one Nation, under law"' for "one Nation un-
ration Act, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(2006) (requiring that government actions substantially burdening religious exercise be justified
by a compelling governmental interest). Douglas Laycock's role in drafting the statute is de-
scribed in Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: the justices, the
Litigants and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 1671, 1695 (2011).
51. Keeping the Faith: Robert Bellah in conversation with Mark Luergensmeyer, SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://www.ssrc.org/features/view/keeping-the-faith-robert-bellah-in-
conversation-with-mark-juergensmeyer/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
52. Laycock, Reviews of a Lifetime, supra note 6, at 961.
53. Id. at 962, 963.
54. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke's "Constitution of
Freedom," 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 393, 427 (1995).
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der God."ss This formula would allow religious believers to hear the
Pledge as endorsing natural law, which really would speak to some of
the need that the phrase "under God" expresses.
Laycock argues that this proposal would not satisfy religious be-
lievers, especially because, unlike a silent starting point, the change to
"under law" would remove God from the Pledge, which would be taken
as an affront by some people who might otherwise like the "under law"
formulation. This is a good point but is not fatal to the suggestion. At
some future time, when religious belief is not so dominant, the "under
law" formulation could serve as a compromise of sorts.
The linkage of law to natural law does impart a depth to neutrality
theory that has been missing. In my recent book I refer to a related
term, "higher law secularism,"56 as precisely what secularism needs to
correct tendencies to relativism and reflexive opposition to religion. I
would prefer, however, a more pointed formulation in the Pledge that
stated "one Nation under a higher law."
What is the difference between these two formulations-under
law versus under a higher law-and why is the difference important?
Because we tend to think that references to God in the public square
are generic and bland, as Laycock does, we look for bland substitutes,
when we look for substitutes at all. The phrase "under law" is just such
a bland substitute for "under God."
But what if these public assertions are not bland but are in fact
revolutionary? That was the case with the word Creator as the source
of rights-as opposed to the King or Parliament-in the Declaration of
Independence. Similarly, if the point of a nation under God is that there
are objective, binding norms in the world, whether or not there is a
God, then a reformulated Pledge should say so. Leaving the matter am-
biguous, as in "one Nation, under law," which might promise procedur-
al protection against arbitrary power but would not necessarily shield
the citizen from a wayward majority, does not make the claim for ob-
jective limits on government. The formulation "under law" is insuffi-
cient to assert that rights are real.
It is easy to anticipate the reaction to a proposal that "one Nation
under a higher law" be substituted for "one Nation under God." Many
religious believers would object on the ground that they reject neutral-
55. Laycock, Reviews of a Lifetime, supra note 6, at 961.
56. See generally LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS, supra note 17.
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ity itself. Such persons would agree that the current language praises
the traditional God and they would want that to continue.
But what about those persons who support neutrality? What
would be their reaction to the higher law proposal?
I can state with confidence that many would oppose the new for-
mula on constitutional grounds. I can assert this confidently because,
as I have discussed elsewhere, a similar issue arose in the lower courts
during the Lee v. Weisman litigation57 The issue in that case was
whether removing the word God from a public high school graduation
ceremony prayer would cure any constitutional violation. The federal
judges involved disagreed.
While Justice Kennedy's majority opinion did not expressly ad-
dress this issue, I tried to show that he did so by implication.58 He cast
the assertion of the existence of an "ethic and a morality which trans-
cend human invention," as the very claim that renders prayer religious
and unconstitutional. And that is precisely the objection that would be
made if a formula for the Pledge of Allegiance were suggested that
made the claim that there is a higher law beyond human choice. This
illustrates the problem that current neutrality theory has with expres-
sions of meaning in the public square.
I will return to this issue of the possible content of communal ex-
pression within the limits of neutrality in the next section. Let me con-
clude here by saying that this exercise of imagining a rewrite of the
Pledge of Allegiance is helpful in pointing to a needed change in neu-
trality theory. For even considering rewriting the Pledge acknowledges
that people may feel the need for communal expressions of meaning,
even if those expressions turn out to be bland and generic. Simply re-
moving the words "under God," even if it could be done, would not
serve this public need. Something would be needed as a substitute.
I asserted above that people feel the need for communal expres-
sions of meaning. But can this public need be met without the symbols
of traditional religion? In other words, what would be the nature of
secular public expressions of meaning? Would such expressions really
not be religious? These are the topics I address in the next section.
57. See Bruce Ledewitz, Seeking "Common Ground": A Secular Statement, 38 HASTINGS CONSTL.




III. A MEANING-FULL SECULAR NEUTRALITY WITHOUT RELIGIOUS IMAGERY
What is the task of neutrality theory? Negatively speaking, most
neutrality theorists would probably say it is to keep government spon-
sored religion out of the public square. What about positively? The
positive task of neutrality theory is to set forth the possibilities for
robust expressions of public meaning that do not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.
Are all substantive moral claims necessarily religious? There is,
for example, an account of politics that regards political life as nothing
more than the private pursuit of self-interest and individual concep-
tions of the good. Mark Lilla sometimes sounds like thiss9 and Richard
Posner does too.6o But I doubt that any neutrality theorist would claim,
as a direct implication of the Establishment Clause, that this is the only
kind of political theory that survives the separation of church and
state. If that is the case, then substantive moral claims are not neces-
sarily religious, and government should be permitted to make such
claims, at least if the government does not use religious images to do
SO.
What secular reason would government have for wanting to make
substantive moral claims? In the past few years, I have claimed in vari-
ous writings that American culture is falling into relativism and that
government, and other institutions, ought to be reclaiming the ground
of moral objectivity through government expression in the public
square. In a recent column, excerpted in the newsmagazine The Week,
New York Times columnist David Brooks describes this descent into
relativism:
If it feels right to me, then it is. That, said David Brooks, pretty much
sums up the moral philosophy of most young Americans, who have
grown up unmoored from any cultural or religious framework for
knowing right from wrong. In a depressing new book, Lost in Trans-
lation, a group of sociologists documents how people in their late
teens and early 20's have come to view moral choices as "just a mat-
ter of individual taste," and seem perplexed when asked to make
judgments about behavior that earlier generations would clearly la-
59. See BRUCE LEDEWITZ, HALLOWED SECULARISM: THEORY, BELIEF AND PRACTICE 88 (2009) (quot-
ing Mark Lilla).
60. While Posner may have changed his tune recently, the following is a fair summary of his
longtime orientation: "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we
shall call his 'self-interest."' RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977). Posner
describes our actual democracy, as opposed to the democracy we might prefer to have, a "democ-




bel as wrong. Cheating on tests? Infidelity? Drunken driving? In in-
terviews, young people say that decisions about such behavior are
"up to the individual." There is virtually no sense of any overarching
value system or obligation to society or to others. "I guess what
makes something right is how I feel about," is a typical refrain. For
this, we can only blame schools, institutions, and families. From
blind deference to churches and authority, our society has swung to
the other extreme and now morality is purely "something that
emerges in the privacy of your own heart."61
The question is not whether Brooks and I are right in this observa-
tion, but whether government is free to agree with us and to try to do
something about it by way of teaching and other forms of persuasion.
Can the government assert that certain moral norms are true? Can the
government assert that, even without being able to specify which mor-
al claims are true, there is such a thing as an objective moral claim in-
dependent of human choice? What form could such moral claims take
without reference to religious doctrine?
There have been some tentative efforts in the Establishment
Clause caselaw to support a secular, meaning-full public square that
suggest positive answers to these questions. Consider two well-known
references to public expressions of meaning by neutrality oriented
Justices-Justices O'Connor and Brennan-in the Pawtucket Rhode
Island creche case, Lynch v. Donnelly.62 In his dissent, Justice Brennan
distinguished the cr&che in the case from presumably constitutional
manifestations of what he called "ceremonial deism":
While I remain uncertain about these questions, I would suggest that
such practices as the designation of "In God We Trust" as our nation-
al motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Alle-
giance can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt phrase, as a
form a "ceremonial deism," protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any
significant religious content. Moreover, these references are unique-
ly suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing pub-
lic occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national
challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our
culture if government were limited to purely non-religious
phrases.63
We see here two different kinds of secular justifications of reli-
gious imagery. First, these images are said no longer to be genuinely
religious, a point I will dispute in the next section. The other point is
that these religious symbols serve certain secular purposes that oth-
61. David Brooks, How Morality Became Obsolete, 11 THE WEEK 14 (2011).
62. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
63. Id. at 716-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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erwise could not be fully served. These purposes include-the word
"such" suggests that Justice Brennan thought there were other secular
needs like these-solemnizing public occasions and inspiring national
commitment.
Justice O'Connor's swing concurrence treated the crkche as com-
parable with other public religious symbols previously upheld and for
this reason Justice O'Connor voted to uphold the cr~che. But as far as
the national motto and other such religious manifestations were con-
cerned, her approach was quite similar to that of Justice Brennan:
Those government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only
ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular pur-
poses of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appre-
ciation in society.64
Like Justice Brennan, Justice O'Connor referred to solemnization,
confidence in the future and promoting recognition of what is worthy
in society. Are these norms secular?
Solemnization of a public event is a purely formal matter and thus
in principle quite secular. A musical fanfare would do as well. We are
just used to beginning important events with prayer invocations.
The other categories referred to by the Justices, however, are not
formal, but normatively substantive. Inspiring confidence in the future,
inspiring the citizenry to meet national challenges and encouraging
recognition for the good or excellent share two characteristics. They
are communal, not individualistic. And they presume the objectivity of
values-that it is rational to claim that something is worthy of appreci-
ation.
Justice Brennan's commitment to encouraging meeting a national
challenge is similar to confidence in the future. The fundamental basis
of this commitment is the moral shape of history, what Martin Luther
King, Jr., called the "arc of the moral universe"-that it is long, "but it
bends toward justice."65
As the Martin Luther King, Jr. quote shows, it is not difficult to find
language that promotes these ends without any expressly religious
content. For that matter, the source of the King quote is said to be a
paraphrase of the great Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, and the
original is just as devoid of formal religious references:
64. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Martin Luther King, Jr., WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/MartinLutherKingJr
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
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I do not pretend to understand the moral universe; the arc is a long
one, my eye reaches but little ways; I cannot calculate the curve and
complete the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by con-
science. And from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.66
The presence of language like this in the public square is crucial to
our public lives together. I believe that it is the positive role of neutrali-
ty theory to explain why this is so and how it does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.
The question that haunts this assertion is whether a deep political
orientation like this, one that relies on robust moral commitments, is
really secular. The answer to that question cannot rest merely on the
presence or absence of reliance on supernatural or revealed sources.
John Rawls did not define "public reason" as excluding only religion.
Public reason excluded direct reliance on any comprehensive doctrine.
67 Public reason sought to arrive at a consensus to regulate the basic
structure of society without appealing to any one metaphysical source.
Thus, public reason might be conceived as excluding the kinds of polit-
ical appeals that Martin Luther King and Theodore Parker are making.
Some theorists may argue that for purposes of the Establishment
Clause, government has no business endorsing any such comprehen-
sive doctrine. From this perspective, a Pledge of Allegiance that re-
ferred to "one Nation subject to the demands of the moral universe"
would be just as objectionable as "one Nation under God."
In 2006, Robert George tried to turn this objection on its head by
arguing that the natural law tradition, and by extension any compre-
hensive doctrine that purports to rely on reason, comports with the
Rawlsian notion of public reason, even though he acknowledged that
Rawls would have denied this.68 George was not writing about the Es-
tablishment Clause, but his argument can easily be applied to it. From
his point of view, the boundary between impermissible endorsement
of religion and permissible government political claims is marked
strictly by reference to the supernatural and the revealed. Even teach-
ings generally regarded as religious would be allowable if they were
based on human observation and reason. Oddly, this might mean that
66. THEODORE PARKER, OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSCIENCE, IN TEN SERMONS OF RELIGION 48 (Boston,
Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1853).
67. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 765-66 (1997).





the government could endorse Confucianism as the national faith
without violating the Establishment Clause.
Without going to that extreme, George's view would allow the
government to make fundamental moral claims without violating the
Establishment Clause. It would also allow the government to endorse a
theory of history. The government could deny, for example, that histo-
ry is a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing. So, the national motto
could constitutionally be phrased as "reality is trustworthy" instead of
In God We Trust.
These moral and historical endorsements would extend not just to
creedal formulations, like the Pledge of Allegiance and the national
motto, but could also be taught in public school classrooms. Public
schools could teach courses in right and wrong.
While all this may sound religious, it is firmly rooted in traditions
usually regarded as secular. The tradition of fundamental rights that
says, for example, that torture is wrong, does so in Kantian terms of
human dignity rather than those of religion.69 Similarly, science teach-
es us a great deal about right and wrong, or at least right and wrong for
people. Sam Harris, the noted New Atheist, argues this specifically in a
recent book.70
Admittedly all this seems to mix the secular and the religious so
that it is not easy to say where the secular begins and the religious
ends. That is not new. C.S. Lewis wrote that the great divide in human
thought was not between religion and secular thinking, but between
relativist and objective accounts of the world. He wrote of the tradition
of objective values:
This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Chris-
tian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply
as 'the Tao.'... It is the doctrine of objective value, the belief that
certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of
thing the universe is and the kind of things we are.71
The philosopher of science Hillary Putnam made a parallel nonre-
ligious argument to uphold the objectivity of mathematical truth with-
out committing himself to the existence of any kind of mathematical
entity:
69. See Louis Henkin, Religion, Religions, and Human Rights, 26 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 229, 231
(1998). ("The human rights idea and ideology begin with an ur value or principle (derived per-
haps from Immanuel Kant), the principle of human dignity.").
70. SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: How SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN VALUES 2 (2011).
71. C.s. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 18 (HarperCollins. 2001) (1944).
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Everything about the success of mathematics, and the deep depend-
ence of much contemporary science, including physics, but not only
physics, on mathematics, supports taking mathematical theorems as
objective truths. .. .72
Putnam's point is not, or not simply, that the success of mathemat-
ics vindicates it pragmatically, but that such success supports the claim
of objective truth. In other words, mathematics works because it is
somehow connected to reality.
And we can say the same thing about cheating on tests, infidelity
and drunken driving, which David Brooks referred to above. No society
will work well that regards such actions as matters of taste. These be-
haviors are objectively wrong. Perhaps even more important, the
wrongness of these behaviors supports the proposition that moral
claims in general can be rationally regarded as right or wrong.
If that is the case, then, quite apart from religion, government
ought to be viewed as able to make arguments about right and wrong
as objective. Making such an argument in the public square would be
an example of a public expression of meaning. Unless we are of the
view that only forms of relativism and Rawls-like formal, process ori-
ented political commitments are secular, we must allow the substan-
tive claim by government that human beings are a certain kind of being
and should be treated in a certain way.
So, what I mean by a meaning-full neutrality is a C.S. Lewis type
view of public life that is open to, and indeed relishes, a comprehensive
understanding of human flourishing and states its claims about these
matters expressly in public creeds and in pedagogical commitments.
That public activity would include spending taxpayer money in sup-
port of such substantive moral and historical claims and subsidizing
groups that promote such claims.
Obviously, such government activity would exclude many citizens
in the sense that they would disagree with the claims being made by
the government and would be offended by the implied criticism of
their views of morality and history. Relativists, for example, would feel
themselves to be outsiders, not fully members of the political commu-
nity, in Justice O'Connor's formulation.
This undeniable fact reminds us that the Establishment Clause,
whatever else it might mean, does not prohibit the government from
offending people. The Clause should be understood as prohibiting of-
fense, but only when that offense is sparked by an establishment of
72. HILARY PUTNAM, ETHICs WITHOUT ONTOLOGY 67 (2004).
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religion. Most other government claims are permissible pursuant to
the doctrine of government speech, whether citizens agree with the
government's message or not.73 The remedy is at the ballot-box.
A people is entitled to a creed. Whether or not such creedal com-
munity is the only kind of political community that is possible, such
community is certainly not forbidden by the Establishment Clause. Any
political creed denies that we live together only as separate individu-
als. It insists that there is such a thing as a common good that is differ-
ent from the sum of all private goods. It defines a communal life. It
must be neutral with regard to religion, but it can be filled with specif-
ic, determinate meaning.
There is yet one more aspect to a meaning-full neutrality beyond
the assertions of substantive moral and political claims: the expression
of genuine piety. Here we come the closest to unconstitutional en-
dorsement of religion. Nevertheless, expressions of such intangible
meaning are also a part of healthy political life.
Justice O'Connor expressed wariness of just such government ex-
pression in the public square. She was willing to uphold the "under
God" language in the Pledge of Allegiance only because it was not, in
her view, a prayer: not "a serious invocation of God or as an expression
of individual submission to divine authority."74
And Justice O'Connor was quite sweeping in her negative descrip-
tion of forbidden prayer and worship: "Any statement that has as its
purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind, or
that is intended to create a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid,
strays from the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing an event
and recognizing a shared religious history."75 Justice O'Connor really
meant "any statement," even one without express religious imagery,
because she then added that "the reasonable observer" would be able
to judge whether any statement represented a forbidden prayer: "any
statement can be imbued by a speaker or listener with the qualities of
prayer."76 Thus any statement might be unconstitutional, even one
without traditional religious reference.
73. See generally Ledewitz, Government Speech, supra note 21, at 84-88 (describing govern-
ment speech doctrine). Equal Protection is another potential limit on government speech, but it is
beyond my topic here.
74. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
75. Id. at 39.
76. Id. at 39-41.
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This is what I meant earlier by the problem of reverence. For Jus-
tice O'Connor there is such a thing as a constitutionally forbidden reli-
gious comportment. The presence of such a comportment in the public
square is problematic whatever the content of expression. Thus, for
example, the holiday of Thanksgiving might be upheld because its orig-
inal attitude of thankfulness to God has now expanded to a kind of
generalized gratitude. Gratitude, after all, is not purely religious. The
atheist writer Ronald Aronson has said that gratitude should be an
essential component of secular life: "Giving thanks ... has been central
to religion, and secular culture needs to be enriched with an equiva-
lent."77
Yet in describing the Thanksgiving holiday in the Allegheny County
crdche case, justice O'Connor referred to Thanksgiving not as a matter
of gratitude but as a matter of patriotism: "the celebration of Thanks-
giving as a public holiday, despite its religious origins, is now generally
understood as a celebration of patriotic values rather than particular
religious beliefs."78
But surely Aronson is more right than O'Connor about what is
necessary for a flourishing public life. Aronson refers to culture, not to
personal expression, and not to the life of the nation-state. A secular
civilization needs reverence and piety also.
Although invoking divine aid presumably refers to a supernatural
being capable of intervening in the world and is thus prohibited by any
form of neutrality, the same cannot be said of the rest of the O'Connor
formula-a penitent state of mind or a spiritual communion.
The point of penitence is "regret for one's wrongdoing or sin-
ning."79 And that notion of sin as a function of revelation is undoubted-
ly one reason it makes Justice O'Connor nervous. But just as embedded
in penitence is regret for violating objective standards of right and
wrong. It is not necessary that such norms be grounded in God or in
any religious tradition. The core meaning is a standard beyond human
invention to which our conduct can be compared to show that we are
falling short. Penitence is a challenge to human pretentions of omnipo-
tence, but it need not be religious in any traditional sense.
The widespread saying, "I am spiritual but not religious" should
remind us that there is a hunger for something beyond daily materiali-
77. Peter Steinfels, The New Atheism, and Something More, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A21,
available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/us/14beliefs.html?_r=2.
78. Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (!989) (O'Connor J., concurring in part).
79. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1994).
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ty. I cannot define what spiritual life is, but it seems to me that the Es-
tablishment Clause should not be read to prohibit all attempts to in-
voke a sense of the spiritual in the public square.
Recently, the film Journey of the Universe sought to convey "won-
der" at the story of that journey. As the cosmologist Brianne Swimme
puts it at the end of the film, as we confront the crisis of the destructive
impact of human civilization on our planet, "wonder will save us."
The film is filled with religiously inspired music. And it plainly
aims at the creation of a spiritual communion. It is no accident that the
co-author of the film, Evelyn Tucker, is a senior lecturer and research
scholar at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and
Yale Divinity School. She is co-founder and co-director of the Forum on
Religion and Ecology at Yale and author of Worldly Wonder: Religions
Enter Their Ecological Phase. The religious feel of the film is undeniable
and intentional. Yet surely it is not a violation of the Establishment
Clause to show this film at a public school.
I admit I am being a little unfair to Justice O'Connor. After all, the
Pledge of Allegiance contains a very traditional and powerful image:
the word God. Just as clearly, this reference to God was sincerely meant
by many people to invoke the aid of a supernatural being. Justice
O'Connor was merely attempting to explain that this reference does
not contain sufficient religious piety to violate the Establishment
Clause. She did not necessarily mean that all forms of piety are uncon-
stitutional.
But I raise the issue of reverence to prevent an unthinking linkage
of superficiality and materialism with secular life. Neutrality theory
must be clear that it is the establishment of religion that is forbidden,
not the establishment of deep longing for meaning.
Thus far, we have considered a robust communal life of expres-
sion without recourse to traditional religious images. In the next sec-
tion, I consider the harder question: whether the use by government of
religious imagery to express this communal life is necessarily a viola-
tion of government neutrality?
IV. A MEANING-FULL SECULAR NEUTRALITY WITH RELIGIOUS IMAGERY
The prior section about meaning without traditionally religious
expression is not as challenging to neutrality as the suggestion in this
Section that there might be secular meaning to classic religious sym-
bols, like God. This proposal threatens the entire structure of neutrality
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by opening up the possibility of acceptance of some government
speech using religious imagery.
Actually, it is an exaggeration to state that this suggestion is con-
sidered challenging. It is actually considered ludicrous. In my experi-
ence, the idea that "one Nation under God" might be anything but
religious is often met by catcalls from neutrality proponents. Steven
Shiffrin undoubtedly speaks for many when he calls such arguments
"simply insulting."Bo An anonymous critic captured this spirit of dis-
dain in responding to an argument I made along these lines in the
American Constitution Society Book Talk blog:
So your solution to the problem is to change the meaning of the
word God? Or at least, to change the meaning of it for those people
who care that a constitutional violation would be taking place unless
the meaning of the word changed? And this is accomplished how?
Buying your book is no doubt the first step, but if you were to give a
preview, do we call up all the dictionary publishers and tell them to
change their entries?81
Actually what I proposed in Church, State, and the Crisis in Ameri-
can Secularism is something like what John Dewey concluded, which is
that the symbol "God" has many meanings, some of which have nothing
to do with a supernatural creator of the universe. Here is how I put it in
the book:
It should not be forgotten that John Dewey, a foundational American
secular figure, never gave up the use of the word "God," though in his
mature thinking he did not believe in the traditional God of mono-
theism. In A Common Faith in 1934 Dewey refers to God as "a unifi-
cation of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin." By
"imaginative," Dewey does not mean unreal. He adds, so there is no
mistake, "the reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their
undeniable power in action."82
I will not rehearse here all the sources I cite in the book who have
used God language in non-supernatural ways, as in "the ultimate mys-
tery of existence itself"83 or the creativity in the universe84 or the
ground of being8s or other formulations of process theology8e and reli-
80. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9,
71 (2004).
81. Bruce Ledewitz, Overcoming the God Wars, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND
POLICY, Jul. 7, 2011, http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/overcoming-the-god-wars.
82. LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS, ,supra note 17, at 132.
83. MICHAEL HAMPSON, GOD WITHOUT GOD: WESTERN SPIRITUALITY WITHOUT THE WRATHFUL KING 8
(John Hunt Publ'g 2008).
84. STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED 6 (Basic Books 2008).
85. TILLICH,supra note 14.
86. See, e.g., ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 23 (Free Press 1979).
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gious naturalism.87 My suggestions for reinterpretation are not neolo-
gisms; they are not a private language.
Nor are these suggestions mere tactics for resolving Establish-
ment Clause issues. Robert Bellah described similar meanings for God
language in the public square years agoes and he was not addressing
any constitutional issue.
Furthermore, it does not do violence to the orthodox meaning of
religious terms when they are used in these ways. When Dewey refers
to the power of the absolute, the religious believer does not object and
say that God is not the power of the absolute. Rather, the believer says
that God is more than the power of the absolute and that to that extent
Dewey is mistaken and too limited. Similarly, when Stuart Kauffman
writes that God is "the very creativity in the universe,"89 the religious
believer does not say God is not the creativity of the universe but that
God is the source of that creativity and is something more than that
creativity.90
So, why has there been, so far, such a complete rejection, of rein-
terpreting God language, and other religious formulations, along non-
religious lines? There are a number of understandable reasons.
To start with, people forget that religious terms need not lose
their religious content when nonreligious meaning is added. Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Lynch, characterized the Court's upholding of
Sunday closing laws in McGowan v. Maryland as embodying that prin-
ciple: "our cases recognize that while a particular governmental prac-
tice may have derived from religious motivations and retain certain
religious connotations, it is nonetheless permissible for the govern-
ment to pursue the practice when it is continued today solely for secu-
lar reasons."91 Thus, the ban on Sunday activities originated in
Christian practice with regard to the Sabbath, but over time the justifi-
cation shifted to the desire for a society-wide day of rest. In principle,
one could say the same about government's use of religious imagery-
that these images begin with a purely religious meaning and then they
evolved to encompass secular meaning as well.
87. See, e.g., JEROME A. STONE, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM TODAY (State Univ. of N.Y. Press 2008).
88. ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 171
(1970).
89. KAUFMAN, supra note 84, at 6.
90. Compare JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, TRUTH AND TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN BELIEF AND WORLD
RELIGIONS 230 (Henry Taylor trans., Ignatius Press 2004). (Pope Benedict: "[Tlhe three questions,
concerning truth and good and God, are but one single question.").
91. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 715 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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But notice that Justice Brennan wrote that Sunday closing laws
were now maintained "solely" for secular reasons. Surely he was aware
that many Christians regarded the Sunday closing laws as continuing
to embody a religious justification. Thus, Brennan must have meant
that the official, proffered justification for the closing laws had become
secular, not that the closings had lost all religious salience for the citi-
zenry in general.
The failure to acknowledge the distinction between official justifi-
cation and popular understanding led Brennan to a serious misstate-
ment with regard to what he called "ceremonial deism." Brennan
probably felt that the national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance were
unconstitutional when he wrote his dissent in Lynch in 1984. That is
presumably why he wrote the he was uncertain about their constitu-
tionality. But if they could be upheld, he stated that it was because they
had lost "through rote repetition any significant religious content."92
Clearly, this observation is false for many millions of Americans.
These references to God may be merely "vestiges" of a once more ro-
bust religious worldview, as Steven Smith says,93 but they undoubtedly
retain religious meaning for many believers.
This fact of continuing religious meaning is part of the reason that
opponents of the presence of God language in the public square object
to the proposed reinterpretation of religious imagery into secular cate-
gories. These opponents recognize that these religious terms represent
fully functioning religious claims. The reinterpretation project is there-
fore viewed as disingenuous.
But, like the Sunday closing laws, religious imagery can retain its
religious meaning for the believer and still be constitutional, as long as
it also contains a secular component. In other words, if the government
can plausibly maintain a secular meaning for a word like God, there
should not be a violation of neutrality because religious believers un-
derstand the word God differently, just as the religious desire for Sun-
day closing laws did not remove a parallel secular justification.
Another objection to the reinterpretation approach, similar to that
of my anonymous critic above, is the claim that religious terms and
images don't have the secular meanings I attribute to them. "God" does
not mean the creativity in the universe. The word can only mean a su-
92. Id. at 716.
93. Smith, supra note 9, at 1019.
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pernatural being and thus can only contain a religious referent.94 A Ten
Commandments display cannot mean that justice is real but can only
refer to a supernatural covenant on Sinai, and so forth.
This objection reflects either genuine ignorance or is an inartful
articulation of a different problem. If the former, then eventually peo-
ple will learn about the rich history of mixed religious/secular mean-
ings that I adverted to above. Nonbelievers do use religious terms, in
fact all the time, for metaphorical resonance. Government could do the
same.
But I think the objection is not to the improper use of a word. I
think the problem is, as Laycock bluntly put it, the "lie." Referring to
the claim by the government in the McCreary County Ten Command-
ments case, Laycock wrote that "the claim that the Commandments
were displayed for their secular legal significance and not for religious
reasons was undoubtedly a lie, and it was based on an absurd reading
of legal history."95 The objection is not so much that secular meanings
for religious images are not possible, but that they do not truly reflect
the government's purpose. The government is actually attempting to
endorse the existence of, and invoke blessings from, the God of the
Bible.
If the government's proffered secular justification is plausible, this
kind of subjective untruthfulness is irrelevant to either law or politics.
The meaning of government expression in the public square is social,
not subjective. Thus the government's official explanation is the one
that, over time, will become the pubic meaning of the government's
action. The lie, if it is such, will become the truth.
Let me make these claims more concrete. In the July 6, 2011 issue
of the New York Times magazine, David Segal wrote a story about
Vince Gilligan, the creator of the AMC series, "Breaking Bad."96 This
series is notorious for raising moral questions about the behavior of its
main character, Walter White, a fatally ill former chemistry teacher
turned crystal meth producer. As Segal put it, "Gilligan and his writers
have posed some large questions about good and evil, questions with
implications for every kind of malefactor you can imagine, from Ponzi
94. Or, as one critic put it, "God means God." LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS, supra
note 17, at 227.
95. Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions and His-
toric Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 503, 529 (2006).





schemers to terrorists. Questions like: Do we live in a world where
terrible people go unpunished for their misdeeds? Or do the wicked
ultimately suffer for their sins?"
It turns out that Gilligan sees these moral issues as arising out of
the very real possibility-Gilligan calls himself an agnostic-that there
is no God: "if there is no such thing as cosmic justice, what is the point
of being good? That's the one thing that no one has ever explained to
me. Why shouldn't I go rob a bank, especially if I'm smart enough to get
away with it? What's stopping me?"
Now imagine that the government is concerned that an increas-
ingly nonbelieving society will fall prey to the sort of nihilism that Gil-
ligan is expressing. So the government adopts slogans like the national
motto and the Pledge of Allegiance to help combat that possibility. And
the government explains that it is trying to get the idea across that
there is such a thing as cosmic justice-that there are bad consequenc-
es in life for bad behavior and that people will not flourish if they be-
have badly.
But the government insists that it does not mean that there is a
God in the traditionally supernatural, monotheistic sense. The image of
God was chosen for this purpose because that image communicates the
message of cosmic justice better than any other. The government freely
admits that many religious believers hear in the God formula the exist-
ence of a Creator, but as long as those believers also hear the message
of cosmic justice, which they do, the government considers the reli-
gious meaning to be a helpful and immediate reminder of the govern-
ment's secular message. Even nonbelievers, like Gilligan above, hear in
the word God the promise of cosmic justice. The government insists
that it is taking no position on the claim by believers that God brings
cosmic justice. As far as the government is concerned, cosmic justice
happens because of the nature of matter and the necessity in evolu-
tionary terms of human cooperation.
What if some government officials, on whose behalf these argu-
ments are being made in court, have been lying? They really do want to
see public school students believe in God and they think these mottos
will assist that goal.
The subjective motivation of individual government officials does
not alter the social reality of the secular explanation in my example at
all. Certainly, the government's concern about nihilism is not belied by
the desire of some officials to inculcate traditional monotheism. Indeed
in all likelihood, that part of the explanation is not a lie. There is a gen-
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uine concern about nihilism by these government officials. Nor is it
untrue that the word God can be a stand-in for the notion of cosmic
justice. Once the government explains the content of the message it is
propounding, that explanation stands on its own, regardless of wheth-
er some, or even all the relevant, government officials think that belief
in the traditional supernatural God is necessary to combat nihilism.
Establishment of religion is always a social act, not a private and secret
one.
The plausibility test is the key to my proposal about the permissi-
ble use of religious imagery. If the government's secular explanation of
its message is not plausible, then endorsement of the religious content
will be the message that the public receives. If a crkche is prominently
displayed by itself, and no other holidays are so honored, as in the Al-
legheny County case, it will be obvious that Christmas is uniquely being
endorsed and it won't matter that the government claims that Christ-
mas stands for the renewal of hope. That government claim will not be
plausible.
The problem heretofore with several of the Justices' explanations
of the permissibility of invocations of God is that these explanations
sometimes suggested that references to God only acknowledged reli-
gion's historical contributions to America97, when it is obvious that
these religious expressions have a continuing substantive religious
content. Similarly, Justices have sometimes argued that these religious
expressions have a kind of bland meaning-"confidence in the future"
for example, as discussed above-when everyone can tell that the
word God asserts something important, even crucial. But once the
power of symbols such as God is acknowledged, the government's sec-
ular justification will no longer seem so alien and laughable.
Since neutrality is a core constitutional norm, the Supreme Court
will have to force the government to explain its actions in an open and
timely way. Like government justifications in areas of fundamental
rights and suspect classifications, post-hoc justifications should not be
considered adequate.98 The point is the expression of social meaning,
which requires express formulation.
97. See, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist concurring in the judgment in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) (referring to the "under God" language in the Pledge of Alle-
giance to "patriotic invocations of God and official acknowledgments of religion's role in our
Nation's history").
98. Cf Zablocke v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("Since our past decisions make clear
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here
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The Court allowed the government in the Grove City Utah case99 to
avoid explaining its intended message in a free speech, Ten Com-
mandments display context. That silence may have been sufficient to
survive a public forum challenge, but an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge should require a plain and express secular response by the gov-
ernment.
Some opponents of government religious expression will argue at
this point that my reinterpretation proposal amounts to giving up their
commitment to neutrality, as if I were saying that they should just "get
over" their objections to God language in the public square. They also
will point out that the use of God language by the government, even
with a secular explanation, may have the effect of strengthening belief
in God in this society.
The giving-up objection assumes the matter in question-that
government is establishing religion. If government is not communi-
cating a religious message, even though some believers are hearing
one, then there is no violation of neutrality. This could still feel like
giving in, but I hope instead that the government's plausible assertion
that there is a secular government message embedded in the use of
religious imagery changes the way God language in the public square is
understood.
The other argument is that any use of the word God will inevitably
strengthen religious belief among Americans. Reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance in school every day will remind students that there are tra-
ditional religions in America and will keep a cultural space open for
these religions among the young. In other words, the government will,
through the use of religious imagery, be substantively aiding tradition-
al religious belief.
This might be the case, but I have to admit it does not bother me.
The incidental, even predictable, advancement of religion is not an
Establishment Clause concern. Great art with religious themes may
also bring students to God, but studying such art is not unconstitution-
al.
Some religious believers will have a different objection. They will
claim that government's use of religious imagery for secular purposes
is an insult. This objection was described by the late professor Steven
significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the
state interests advanced in support of the classification is required.").
99. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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Goldberg in his book, Bleached Faith.ioo This kind of government use is
said to deprive religion of its genuine power and to demean its holy
message. "For God so loved the world..." is not the same as some gen-
eral government assertion about the objectivity of values.
My response to this is that, as the example of "cosmic justice"
above shows, there is not a chasm between the secular meaning of
religious imagery and its sectarian meaning. There is a reason why
Vince Gilligan linked the possible absence of God to the possible ab-
sence of cosmic justice. God is a proper stand-in for cosmic justice be-
cause God has something to do with justice in traditional religious
understanding.
I am not suggesting false or inappropriate uses of religious image-
ry to convey secular meanings. These secular meanings are, and always
have been, a part of the purely religious meaning of the image. That is
why nonbelievers have used these religious images.
A final and more general objection to the whole project of reinter-
preting neutrality is to ask, why bother to do all this? The Supreme
Court as currently constituted is going to uphold all the same govern-
ment uses of religious imagery that I propose upholding, so why try to
come up with a new interpretation of neutrality?
There are three reasons why a new interpretation is needed. First,
while the Court seems currently settled on upholding most so-called
nonsectarian religious imagery used by government, as well as uphold-
ing public displays such as Ten Commandments monuments and
crosses at public cemeteries, there is no agreement even among the
five Justices-or maybe six if one counts Justice Stephen Breyer-who
compose this majority as to why such religious imagery is constitu-
tional. These actual and potential rulings are not stable in the way they
would be if doctrine in the field were settled. Once Justice Anthony
Kennedy leaves the Court-and he will be 76 years old in July 2012-
the results in Establishment Clause cases could radically change. Ac-
cordingly, some kind of new doctrine is needed.
Of the obvious choices discussed in this Symposium-neutrality, a
pro-religion stance, or some kind of justiciability limit (a related possi-
bility would be to de-constitutionalize the field, as Steven Smith sug-
gests)-neutrality in its current state seems politically unworkable
because, as Laycock argues, government neutrality should result in the
100. STEVEN GOLDBERG, BLEACHED FAITH: THE TRAGIC COST WHEN RELIGION IS FORCED INTO THE
PUBLIC SQUARE 6 (Stanford Law Books 2008).
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general invalidation of government use of religious imagery, such as
the national motto or the Pledge of Allegiance.1o But a nominee to the
Supreme Court who seemed likely to invalidate the Pledge of Alle-
giance would not be confirmed by the Senate. Nor would the Court act
lightly in that way, in any event. Thus, in the long run, either neutrality
theory must change or neutrality will cease to be a practical option in
the courts.
The second reason to reinterpret neutrality theory to suggest the
acceptability of government use of religious imagery in certain circum-
stances, is to reduce political strife in American public life. If the consti-
tutional theory to which large numbers of Americans are devoted
counsels that the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional, and the
courts do nothing about it, then the matter must be pressed politically.
That would result in years of religiously polarizing elections.
On the other hand, a new interpretation of neutrality that showed
that the Pledge of Allegiance and other instances of God-language are
constitutional, would reduce the political temperature and lessen the
rancor behind the culture wars. If a new approach to neutrality were
accepted, there would be no reason to fight to remove God language
from the public square. Of course, any such interpretation of neutrality
would have to be convincing to nonbelievers.
Finally, and in my view the most important reason to reinterpret
neutrality, is that a religion-friendly neutrality would assist secularism
in moving away from reflexive opposition to anything that partakes of
religion. There are secular communities in America in which the per-
ennial questions of human life-for example Kant's three questions:
what can I know, what should I do and what can I hope for?-or the
more general forms of the question-what is all this about, why am I
here?-are not even on the table for discussion. This is what David
Brooks was pointing to above. The searching and longing behind such
deep questions seem to have been replaced in much of American secu-
larism by a kind of easygoing materialism, which only masks a deeper
despair.102
Humankind's religious traditions have been the repository of our
deepest thinking about what it means to live a human life. My neutrali-
ty proposal might be considered a way of bringing secularism back into
the orbit of religion without sacrificing a scientific worldview. In other
101. See Laycock, Reviews of a Lifetime, supra note 6, at 961.




words, a meaning-full neutrality might be a way of saving secularism
from itself.
CONCLusIoN: MARSH-AND LEE
This brings me to a brief consideration of Christopher Lund's im-
portant recent article on the hidden costs of legislative prayer1os in
order to flesh out the implications of a meaning-full neutrality. Let me
say at the outset that Chris succeeds in his stated goal. Some persons
who consider themselves committed to neutrality foolishly counsel
acceptance of religious expression in the public square on the ground
that opposing such imagery would have political consequences worse
than the consequences of allowing religious imagery. They ask, in ef-
fect, what harm can a little religion do? Chris painstakingly shows in
his article precisely how harmful such governmentally sponsored reli-
gious expression can be.
That said, Chris's article also demonstrates the weakness in neu-
trality theory that I discuss above. Specifically, the article does not
acknowledge any value of, or need for, communal expression in a dem-
ocratic community. It does not provide a path to such communal ex-
pression in the context of a substitute for legislative prayer that would
not use religious imagery. And, the article does not consider what secu-
lar values legislative prayer might serve, even though it uses religious
imagery.
All of these omissions spring from an undue emphasis on individ-
ualism in neutrality theory. To see this, consider Chris's overall criti-
cism of prayers before legislative sessions. What exactly is wrong with
such prayers? It is not so much that such prayers reflect an establish-
ment of religion, though of course that is the article's position. The
more serious problem with such prayers, and by extension all tenden-
cies to allow government to speak religiously, is that the prayers con-
stitute "a genuine threat to religious liberty."1o4 And Chris spends the
rest of the article demonstrating how this occurs.
The threat is that "someone's religious liberty will inevitably be
lost" when government speaks religiously. Government must pick who
may express religion and who may not. Government can do this either
by censoring the religious expression itself-as in telling the Christian
that she may not mention Jesus-or by discriminating in the selection
103. Lund, supra note 8.
104. Id. at 974.
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of the religious speaker. Either way, this is a zero-sum game-some
persons will not be permitted to pray. Thus, Chris concludes, Marsh
should be overturned and no legislative prayer permitted: "[t]he only
way to really protect religious liberty, it seems, is by not having legisla-
tive prayer at all."105
But there would still be a zero-sum game, even if Marsh were
overruled. As Chris would acknowledge, the liberty of the majority to
engage in prayer prior to legislative sessions would be sacrificed if
Marsh were overruled. So how can Chris suggest that overruling Marsh
is the way to protect religious liberty?
The reason that liberty seems protected when prayer is prohibit-
ed is that current neutrality theory recognizes religious liberty only
when individuals are acting. Conversely, when the majority is acting as
a majority-and not just as the largest group of individuals-there is
no liberty interest to be lost. In fact, when the majority acts in accord-
ance with its religious beliefs, there is not only no protected religious
liberty interest, there is asserted to be a forbidden religious establish-
ment.
The imbalance of this neutrality approach would be more appar-
ent if the situation were described differently. What if there were a
small, but not insignificant, group of Americans whose religion taught
that when government is conducted without seeking divine wisdom,
society falls into chaos? And what if, at the same time, the vast majority
of Americans were completely secular?
Under these circumstances, what would happen if this minority
asked that occasionally they be allowed to conduct a ceremony of wel-
coming divine wisdom before a session of the legislature? This feels
completely different from Marsh, does it not? This feels like a proposed
exercise in religious liberty. And I imagine that many people who op-
pose Marsh would not oppose granting this request on occasion.
But how does this imagined situation differ importantly from our
actual situation? Shouldn't believers be permitted to indulge their be-
liefs even if they are the majority?
One way to reset the one-sidedness of analysis of legislative pray-
er is to compare two different contexts, rather than just examining the
fallout from one. Let's compare the regime that Marsh has led to with
the practices that have evolved since Lee v. Weisman banned prayer at
public high school graduations. In a way, Marsh and Lee represent mir-
105. Id. at 977.
2012] 761
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ror images of how to deal with religion at important public events. I
presume that something like Lee is what Chris would like to see in-
stead of Marsh to resolve the issue of legislative prayer.
It should be noted at the outset, that there is much less litigation
over Lee than there has been over Marsh. The history of relatively little
public high school litigation, versus the cases that have unfolded
around legislative prayer, will seem at first glance a great advantage to
banning prayer. But there are secret costs to banning graduation pray-
er also. In the school districts that strictly adhere to Lee, we may as-
sume that moments of silence have been substituted for prayer. That is
what was supposed to occur, for example, this past May, in the town of
Bastrop, Louisiana, which had scheduled a traditional prayer for a pub-
lic high school graduation.106 Then a local atheist student, Damon
Fowler, emailed the superintendent of schools, pointing out the uncon-
stitutionality of this traditional prayer under current law-presumably
referring to Lee. The prayer was then dropped.
The school board chose to offer instead a moment of silence at the
beginning of the graduation ceremony. Undoubtedly this was done on
advice of counsel and likely because a moment of silence was the per-
missible fallback position to prayer in Wallace v.Jaffree in 1985.107
Now this substitution, which probably goes on in many school dis-
tricts, represents a real cost. In the context of a ceremony like a high
school graduation, a moment of silence is the antithesis of what the
community had been looking for in desiring public prayer. The people
who wanted prayer were looking for a communal expression with
some content. Without for the moment considering what is and is not
constitutional, we should at least grant that a moment of silence is not
that kind of communal act.
Chris admits, though reluctantly, that prayer at public events does
potentially serve secular purposes: "formally opening the session, sol-
emnizing the proceedings, and unifying the attendees."1oB If so, these
secular purposes are largely lost in a regime of moments of silence.
But I think prayer expresses a great deal more than that. It ex-
presses hope and confidence in the future, as even Justices O'Connor
106. I described the events in Bastrop in more detail in Religion Dispatches in May 2011.
Bruce Ledewitz, It's Time to Reconsider Graduation Prayer in Public High Schools, RELIGION
DISPATCHES, May 26, 2011,
http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/atheologies/4680/it%/0E2%80%99s-time_toreconsi
der-graduation-prayerjin-public high-schools (May 26, 2011).
107. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
108. Lund, supra note 8, at 1033.
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and Brennan seemed to grant to ceremonial deism. More importantly
in the context of a high school graduation, prayer is meant to inspire
the graduates and the audience to serve noble and enriching purposes
with their lives: to appreciate what is worthy in life. Just consider that
actual prayers that were deemed unconstitutional in Lee itself.1o9
Those prayers certainly sought to inspire worthy lives.
It might be objected that secular expressions could be created to
serve these needs instead of religious prayer. But that possibility actu-
ally illustrates part of my point. Of course secular language could be
developed to do that. Neutrality theory, however, has not considered
this task to be important. There is nothing about this need in Chris's
article, for example.
There are two other costs from Lee. First, banning prayer at high
school graduations has undoubtedly spawned forms of civil disobedi-
ence. Some school boards have probably continued prayer despite Lee,
as the Board intended to do in Bastrop. In addition, some students
have probably taken the task of prayer on, themselves.
109. Rabbi Leslie Gutterman's Invocation and Benediction were as follows:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected,
we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its court system
where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in
trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so
live that they might help to share it.




o God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for learning which we have
celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important milestone. Send Your
blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to understand that we
are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You require
of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this
special, happy occasion.
AMEN.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1992).
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The latter is what ultimately occurred in Batrop. When graduating
senior Lacie Mae Mattice stood up to lead the planned moment of si-
lence, she invited the audience to join her instead in the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer.
Once something like this occurs, it is too late for a lawsuit. Any-
way, Mattice's act was not unconstitutional since it happened in direct
contravention of the school board's directive. And what could school
officials have done once Mattice began her protest? How many profess-
ing Christian students dragged off graduation stages would it take be-
fore a revolution was sparked in this country-a revolution that would
at least manifest in a constitutional amendment protecting public
prayer?
The other form of response to Lee has been an explosion of so-
called private speech, which both Chris and I would probably usually
find to be government speech and government action. I have heard
Jesus praised by students who were chosen to speak at graduation
because of non-religious accomplishments, such as becoming class
president. These students were presumably not told anything by
school officials about religion in terms of their remarks.
A large-scale example of such private speech occurred in the
spring of 2011, in a town outside Pittsburgh. A friend of mine with his
daughter attended a completely Christian ceremony-called a bacca-
laureate-held the weekend of the public high school graduation, ap-
parently without any material school board support. About half of the
graduating students and their families attended.
I can hear some neutrality theorists praising this outcome. That is
just what they wanted, for the Christians in the community to have
their own religious ceremony and leave the official government gradu-
ation ceremony to a purely secular form.
But this is lightly said only because current neutrality theory has
not been pressed to its logical conclusion. Neutrality theory has always
shamelessly, and without acknowledgment, borrowed from a more
religious past.
Imagine that next year, the school board in that town sends out
this announcement: We have concluded that all the pomp and ceremo-
ny of high school graduation is the relic of a religious past. The im-
portant secular goal of graduation is just that-preparation for college
and/or a career. So we are just going to mail out diplomas. We under-
stand that Christians in our school community are going to organize a
private ceremony to express hope, faith and love in regard to our grad-
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uates. They are welcome to do this if they wish. We have nothing to do
with that.
This school board response would not be the same as that of
communities that closed their municipal swimming pools to avoid the
desegregation command of Brown.11o Those communities were refus-
ing to obey a constitutional command. My hypothetical school board
would believe it was serving a constitutional value: neutrality. But it
would be a neutrality empty of meaning. Most families, even secular
ones, would be very disappointed. What we need, instead, is a mean-
ing-full neutrality. We need more expression in the public square, not
less.
So what would I suggest instead? Like Chris, I would like to see
Marsh rewritten. But I would like to see Lee rewritten as well. In both
instances, I would like to see the Supreme Court uphold the principle
of neutrality, but a different neutrality than is currently understood.
I would like to see an opinion in which the Justices state that,
while government may not endorse religion it may promote many dif-
ferent kinds of expressions of meaning. That could include the rever-
ence of the hymn to science I described above. That could include
sectarian prayers of the sort prayed by Rick Warren at President
Obama's Inauguration, in which Warren ended by invoking "the One
who changed my life -Yeshua, Esa, Jesus." That could include portions
of the Humanist Manifesto of 1933.
The more expressions of meaning, the better. Neutrality means
that government may not endorse religion. But neutrality should not
prevent the government from endorsing the tradition of meaning that
opposes relativism and nihilism, of which our religions are an im-
portant part. Government can do that by utilizing different aspects of
that great tradition, as long as it does not limit itself to the religious
aspects.
That kind of prayer opinion could be issued without any historical
exceptions for religious prayer or politically inspired surrenders to the
expression of religious truth. There need be no embarrassment at the
presence of the divine in the great texts of American political life. Un-
der this understanding, the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's
Second Inaugurals Address could be read without apology.
110 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding constitutionality of the
closure of municipal pools).
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Let ministers and rabbis and Imams speak at graduation. And sci-
entists. And poets. The more different kinds of people speak, the less
likely it is that religion as such is being endorsed.
What is needed to accomplish this is a new and broader interpre-
tation of the neutrality required by the Establishment Clause. This new
neutrality would emphasize the common ground that majority believ-
ers, minority believers and many nonbelievers share. It would aim at a
public square filled with expressions of meaning.
Undoubtedly, each such expression would risk offending some
people. But the public square as a whole would reflect the basic com-
mitments of most Americans to the objectivity of values, the reality of
justice and the necessity for reverence and gratitude. Certainly, there
are Americans who would object to such an array. But their objections
would not be to the establishment of religion. The meaning-full public
square contains religious expressions, among others, but it does not
endorse religion. Therefore, while there would not be unanimous
agreement with the content in such a public square, there would be no
violation of the Establishment Clause.
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